Here I use ChatGPT to have an imaginary conversation between Sapolsky and Sandel:
Let's imagine a conversation between Michael J. Sandel, renowned for his teachings on justice, ethics, and political philosophy at Harvard University, and Robert M. Sapolsky, a Stanford University professor and author of "Determined," a book arguing against the concept of free will. Their discussion might explore the intersections and divergences in their thoughts on moral responsibility and free will.
Sandel: Robert, your work on the biological determinants of behavior presents a compelling case against the traditional concept of free will. In my "Justice" course, we often discuss the philosophical underpinnings of morality and responsibility. How do you reconcile the absence of free will with moral accountability?
Sapolsky: Michael, I appreciate the nuance of the moral frameworks you explore. My position, as articulated in "Determined," is that our actions are the product of genetics, environment, and brain chemistry. This doesn't absolve us of responsibility but requires us to rethink it. If our decisions are predetermined by such factors, then societal structures, including justice systems, must reflect this understanding.
Sandel: That's fascinating. I argue that a just society must consider the moral and civic virtues of its citizens. Even if we accept that our choices are influenced by external factors, doesn't the capacity for reflection and reasoning play a role in shaping our ethical decisions?
Sapolsky: Absolutely, Michael. However, my argument is that the capacity for reflection is itself influenced by biological and environmental conditions. It doesn't negate the importance of ethical deliberation but suggests that free will might not be as free as we think. Our understanding of morality should incorporate these biological insights without diminishing the value of ethical debate.
Sandel: I see your point, Robert. This raises an interesting question about justice and punishment. If individuals are less responsible for their actions in the traditional sense, how should our legal system adapt?
Sapolsky: It's crucial that we shift towards a rehabilitative rather than punitive system. Understanding the determinants of behavior can help us tailor interventions that address the root causes of antisocial behavior, rather than simply punishing individuals for actions they may have limited control over.
Sandel: Your insights challenge us to reconsider the foundations of justice and ethics. While we may not agree on all points, the dialogue between biology and philosophy enriches our understanding of human behavior and moral responsibility.
Sapolsky: Indeed, Michael. It's conversations like these that push us to explore the complex interplay between biology, environment, and morality. By acknowledging the limits of our freedom, we can better appreciate the factors that shape our behavior and strive for a more compassionate and understanding society.
This imagined dialogue showcases the rich, albeit complex, interplay between philosophical concepts of morality and the biological determinants of behavior, highlighting both agreements and disagreements between two intellectual giants from Harvard and Stanford.
Sandel: Robert, building on that, one might argue that acknowledging the biological constraints on our behavior could potentially undermine the motivation for moral improvement. If our actions are predetermined, what incentive do individuals have to strive for betterment?
Sapolsky: That's a valid concern, Michael. Yet, I believe understanding our biological limitations actually empowers us. By recognizing these constraints, we can more effectively address them. For example, if we know certain behaviors are rooted in neurological or genetic predispositions, we can work towards creating environments that mitigate these predispositions or develop interventions that modify them. It's not about resigning to determinism but leveraging our understanding of it for positive change.
Sandel: So, you're suggesting a model of society that doesn't abandon the pursuit of moral virtues but rather redefines the paths we take to achieve them?
Sapolsky: Precisely. The key is not to discard the notion of improvement or moral striving but to approach it with a deeper understanding of human nature. This might mean, for example, focusing on early education and social support systems that encourage the development of pro-social behaviors from a young age.
Sandel: Intriguingly, this approach dovetails with some of the philosophical traditions we explore in my classes, where the focus is on cultivating virtues through the right kinds of practices and institutions. It seems, then, that despite our different starting points, there's common ground in the belief that society plays a crucial role in shaping moral behavior.
Sapolsky: Exactly, Michael. And this is where interdisciplinary dialogue is invaluable. The synthesis of insights from biology, psychology, and philosophy can guide us in constructing a more nuanced and effective framework for understanding and fostering ethical behavior.
Sandel: It strikes me, Robert, that our discussion reflects a broader philosophical question: What does it mean to lead a good life, and how can society help its members achieve this? Your research adds a vital piece to this puzzle, challenging us to consider the biological underpinnings of our actions.
Sapolsky: And your work, Michael, on justice and morality, reminds us of the importance of ethical reflection and the role of community in shaping our destinies. It's clear that a multifaceted approach, one that includes biological, psychological, and philosophical perspectives, is crucial to answering that question.
Sandel: Well, Robert, it seems our dialogue has not only highlighted our areas of agreement and disagreement but also pointed to a collaborative path forward. By bridging our disciplines, we can deepen our understanding of human nature and better address the ethical challenges of our time.
Sapolsky: I couldn't agree more, Michael. It's through these conversations that we can hope to unravel the complexities of free will, moral responsibility, and ultimately, the essence of what it means to be human.
This continuation of the dialogue further emphasizes the importance of interdisciplinary dialogue in addressing the nuanced interplay between free will, moral responsibility, and societal influence, showcasing how perspectives from different fields can converge to offer a more comprehensive understanding of human nature and ethics.
Sandel: Robert, as our conversation evolves, it becomes increasingly clear that we both value the pursuit of a good life and the role of society in guiding moral behavior. However, I sense that our underlying philosophies might diverge on the question of individual agency. I believe in the power of choice and moral reasoning, even within the constraints of biology and society. Doesn't a too-strong emphasis on determinism risk diminishing personal responsibility?
Sapolsky: Michael, that's precisely where our most significant disagreement lies. While I acknowledge the role of choice and reasoning, my research leads me to see these as ultimately rooted in and limited by our biological makeup and external circumstances. The risk of not emphasizing determinism enough is that we overestimate the role of individual agency and, by extension, fail to address the systemic and biological factors that shape behavior. The balance is delicate, but my perspective errs on the side of caution against overvaluing free will.
Sandel: I worry that this viewpoint could lead to a society where moral expectations are so deeply tied to determinism that the concept of striving for virtue becomes obsolete. If we follow your argument to its logical conclusion, it seems we might absolve individuals of moral responsibility, attributing every action to a cause outside their control.
Sapolsky: On the contrary, Michael. Recognizing the limits of free will doesn't absolve individuals of responsibility; it redefines it. It means our moral and legal systems must evolve to reflect a deeper understanding of human behavior. The goal is not to excuse bad behavior but to prevent it by creating conditions that promote positive behaviors and by understanding and addressing negative behaviors in more effective ways.
Sandel: But doesn't this perspective undermine the very foundation of ethical philosophy—that individuals can make choices that are morally right or wrong? If every decision can be traced back to a deterministic cause, what space remains for ethics?
Sapolsky: Ethics remains crucial, but it too must evolve. It shifts from judging actions in a binary moral framework to understanding behaviors in a holistic context that includes biological predispositions and environmental factors. This doesn't eliminate morality but complicates it, demanding that we consider not just the action but the entirety of influences that led to it.
Sandel: It seems, then, that our fundamental disagreement revolves around how we view the nature of human freedom and its implications for morality and justice. You see determinism as a framework that informs and guides our understanding of behavior, requiring societal structures to adapt accordingly. Meanwhile, I worry about the consequences of diminishing the role of individual moral agency in our pursuit of justice and the good life.
Sapolsky: Indeed, Michael. While I respect the intention behind your concerns, I believe that embracing the insights of determinism offers a path to a more compassionate and just society. It's a shift that recognizes the complexity of human behavior and seeks to address it in a manner that is both scientifically informed and ethically nuanced.
Sandel: And there lies our impasse. Though we share common goals, our visions for achieving them diverge at a fundamental level. This discussion has illuminated the profound complexities at the intersection of biology, morality, and justice, reminding us of the enduring challenges in understanding and shaping human behavior.
Sapolsky: Precisely. Our debate, while unresolved, highlights the importance of continued dialogue across disciplines to grapple with these questions. The pursuit of knowledge and understanding, especially in areas as complex as free will and moral responsibility, benefits from diverse perspectives, even—or perhaps especially—when they conflict.
In this continued dialogue, Sandel and Sapolsky reach the heart of their disagreement: the role and extent of individual agency within the constraints of determinism. While both scholars aim for a society that fosters moral behavior, their debate underscores the tension between acknowledging biological and environmental determinants of behavior and preserving the concept of individual moral choice. This conversation encapsulates the challenging balance between scientific insights into human behavior and the philosophical traditions of morality and free will.
Sandel: If we continue down your path, Robert, I fear we might arrive at a society where the concept of personal achievement or moral progress loses its meaning. If every action is the result of deterministic processes, then the notion of striving—to be better, to overcome adversity—could be seen as illusory. How do we then inspire individuals to aspire towards greater ethical standards or achievements?
Sapolsky: Michael, I understand your concerns, but I believe this perspective offers a different kind of inspiration. When we understand the deterministic influences on behavior, we can strive not in the traditional sense of overcoming these influences through sheer will, but by intelligently designing our environments and interventions to promote positive outcomes. This doesn't devalue achievement; it contextualizes it within a framework that acknowledges the complexity of human behavior.
Sandel: But isn't there a risk that this approach leads to a form of paternalism, where the state or scientific elite decides what is 'best' for individuals, based on their understanding of determinism? How do we reconcile this with the value of autonomy and the freedom to choose, even to fail?
Sapolsky: The challenge, then, is to navigate these insights responsibly, ensuring that they empower individuals rather than restrict them. This necessitates a democratic dialogue about how we apply our understanding of determinism, a dialogue that must include ethicists, scientists, policymakers, and, crucially, the public. Autonomy can still be valued within this framework, but it's informed by an understanding of the constraints we face.
Sandel: This brings us to another point of contention. By emphasizing determinism, do we not run the risk of fostering a society that is overly deterministic in its outlook, one that may be less forgiving, less capable of hope or redemption, because it views individuals as products of their biology and environment rather than as agents capable of change?
Sapolsky: On the contrary, Michael, recognizing the deterministic factors influencing behavior opens the door to more compassionate and effective approaches to rehabilitation and change. It allows us to see the potential for transformation not through moral condemnation but through understanding and addressing the underlying causes of behaviors. This perspective doesn't close the door on hope or redemption; it redefines them in more tangible, achievable terms.
Sandel: Yet, this redefinition seems to sideline the role of personal effort and moral deliberation in favor of a model that could be seen as mechanistic. Doesn't the dignity of human choice lie in the capacity to decide, to weigh ethical considerations, and to act upon them, regardless of our biological and environmental conditioning?
Sapolsky: Dignity, Michael, can also be found in the recognition of our shared humanity, in understanding the complex interplay of factors that shape our behavior. This doesn't negate the role of personal effort; it situates it within a broader, more realistic context. The challenge is to balance these insights with respect for the individual, fostering an environment where personal and social transformation is possible and celebrated.
Their continued disagreement reveals the depth of the philosophical divide between Sandel and Sapolsky. Sandel worries about the potential loss of individual agency and moral striving in a deterministic framework, while Sapolsky argues for a redefined notion of personal achievement and moral progress that incorporates deterministic insights. This dialogue underscores the tension between preserving the notion of free will and embracing a scientific understanding of human behavior, a debate that is central to contemporary discussions of ethics, justice, and human nature.
My journaling, current reading and reflection have made me want to follow up on this piece. I want to share my updated thinking regarding one aspect of what I wrote:
"Now, people might get triggered by the implications of this perspective. 'So you're saying no one is responsible for their actions?' Kind of - yes. At least that's the conclusion Sapolsky shared in Determined, and I agree with (i.e., Do you blame someone for having a mental illness? Sapolsky argues that the same biological past that leads to someone having a mental illness is the same biological 'stuff' that dictates our decisions, which we perceive we have agency over but don't)."
I already said "kind of" in my statement, but I don't think I captured the nuance of how on the edge I feel about this in my piece. And I have been currently navigating these new question that have popped up as a result of this turmoil in my mind: Is what I wrote saying that I believe there is no distinction between what is right or wrong? How have we defined right or wrong in the past and now? And how does that affect how we move and act in the world? I don't think Sapolsky is saying that you can just have people hurting other people without consequence, but I still struggle with does that mean we can't hold anyone morally responsible?
Here I use ChatGPT to have an imaginary conversation between Sapolsky and Sandel:
Let's imagine a conversation between Michael J. Sandel, renowned for his teachings on justice, ethics, and political philosophy at Harvard University, and Robert M. Sapolsky, a Stanford University professor and author of "Determined," a book arguing against the concept of free will. Their discussion might explore the intersections and divergences in their thoughts on moral responsibility and free will.
Sandel: Robert, your work on the biological determinants of behavior presents a compelling case against the traditional concept of free will. In my "Justice" course, we often discuss the philosophical underpinnings of morality and responsibility. How do you reconcile the absence of free will with moral accountability?
Sapolsky: Michael, I appreciate the nuance of the moral frameworks you explore. My position, as articulated in "Determined," is that our actions are the product of genetics, environment, and brain chemistry. This doesn't absolve us of responsibility but requires us to rethink it. If our decisions are predetermined by such factors, then societal structures, including justice systems, must reflect this understanding.
Sandel: That's fascinating. I argue that a just society must consider the moral and civic virtues of its citizens. Even if we accept that our choices are influenced by external factors, doesn't the capacity for reflection and reasoning play a role in shaping our ethical decisions?
Sapolsky: Absolutely, Michael. However, my argument is that the capacity for reflection is itself influenced by biological and environmental conditions. It doesn't negate the importance of ethical deliberation but suggests that free will might not be as free as we think. Our understanding of morality should incorporate these biological insights without diminishing the value of ethical debate.
Sandel: I see your point, Robert. This raises an interesting question about justice and punishment. If individuals are less responsible for their actions in the traditional sense, how should our legal system adapt?
Sapolsky: It's crucial that we shift towards a rehabilitative rather than punitive system. Understanding the determinants of behavior can help us tailor interventions that address the root causes of antisocial behavior, rather than simply punishing individuals for actions they may have limited control over.
Sandel: Your insights challenge us to reconsider the foundations of justice and ethics. While we may not agree on all points, the dialogue between biology and philosophy enriches our understanding of human behavior and moral responsibility.
Sapolsky: Indeed, Michael. It's conversations like these that push us to explore the complex interplay between biology, environment, and morality. By acknowledging the limits of our freedom, we can better appreciate the factors that shape our behavior and strive for a more compassionate and understanding society.
This imagined dialogue showcases the rich, albeit complex, interplay between philosophical concepts of morality and the biological determinants of behavior, highlighting both agreements and disagreements between two intellectual giants from Harvard and Stanford.
Continued imaginary dialogue:
Sandel: Robert, building on that, one might argue that acknowledging the biological constraints on our behavior could potentially undermine the motivation for moral improvement. If our actions are predetermined, what incentive do individuals have to strive for betterment?
Sapolsky: That's a valid concern, Michael. Yet, I believe understanding our biological limitations actually empowers us. By recognizing these constraints, we can more effectively address them. For example, if we know certain behaviors are rooted in neurological or genetic predispositions, we can work towards creating environments that mitigate these predispositions or develop interventions that modify them. It's not about resigning to determinism but leveraging our understanding of it for positive change.
Sandel: So, you're suggesting a model of society that doesn't abandon the pursuit of moral virtues but rather redefines the paths we take to achieve them?
Sapolsky: Precisely. The key is not to discard the notion of improvement or moral striving but to approach it with a deeper understanding of human nature. This might mean, for example, focusing on early education and social support systems that encourage the development of pro-social behaviors from a young age.
Sandel: Intriguingly, this approach dovetails with some of the philosophical traditions we explore in my classes, where the focus is on cultivating virtues through the right kinds of practices and institutions. It seems, then, that despite our different starting points, there's common ground in the belief that society plays a crucial role in shaping moral behavior.
Sapolsky: Exactly, Michael. And this is where interdisciplinary dialogue is invaluable. The synthesis of insights from biology, psychology, and philosophy can guide us in constructing a more nuanced and effective framework for understanding and fostering ethical behavior.
Sandel: It strikes me, Robert, that our discussion reflects a broader philosophical question: What does it mean to lead a good life, and how can society help its members achieve this? Your research adds a vital piece to this puzzle, challenging us to consider the biological underpinnings of our actions.
Sapolsky: And your work, Michael, on justice and morality, reminds us of the importance of ethical reflection and the role of community in shaping our destinies. It's clear that a multifaceted approach, one that includes biological, psychological, and philosophical perspectives, is crucial to answering that question.
Sandel: Well, Robert, it seems our dialogue has not only highlighted our areas of agreement and disagreement but also pointed to a collaborative path forward. By bridging our disciplines, we can deepen our understanding of human nature and better address the ethical challenges of our time.
Sapolsky: I couldn't agree more, Michael. It's through these conversations that we can hope to unravel the complexities of free will, moral responsibility, and ultimately, the essence of what it means to be human.
This continuation of the dialogue further emphasizes the importance of interdisciplinary dialogue in addressing the nuanced interplay between free will, moral responsibility, and societal influence, showcasing how perspectives from different fields can converge to offer a more comprehensive understanding of human nature and ethics.
Sandel: Robert, as our conversation evolves, it becomes increasingly clear that we both value the pursuit of a good life and the role of society in guiding moral behavior. However, I sense that our underlying philosophies might diverge on the question of individual agency. I believe in the power of choice and moral reasoning, even within the constraints of biology and society. Doesn't a too-strong emphasis on determinism risk diminishing personal responsibility?
Sapolsky: Michael, that's precisely where our most significant disagreement lies. While I acknowledge the role of choice and reasoning, my research leads me to see these as ultimately rooted in and limited by our biological makeup and external circumstances. The risk of not emphasizing determinism enough is that we overestimate the role of individual agency and, by extension, fail to address the systemic and biological factors that shape behavior. The balance is delicate, but my perspective errs on the side of caution against overvaluing free will.
Sandel: I worry that this viewpoint could lead to a society where moral expectations are so deeply tied to determinism that the concept of striving for virtue becomes obsolete. If we follow your argument to its logical conclusion, it seems we might absolve individuals of moral responsibility, attributing every action to a cause outside their control.
Sapolsky: On the contrary, Michael. Recognizing the limits of free will doesn't absolve individuals of responsibility; it redefines it. It means our moral and legal systems must evolve to reflect a deeper understanding of human behavior. The goal is not to excuse bad behavior but to prevent it by creating conditions that promote positive behaviors and by understanding and addressing negative behaviors in more effective ways.
Sandel: But doesn't this perspective undermine the very foundation of ethical philosophy—that individuals can make choices that are morally right or wrong? If every decision can be traced back to a deterministic cause, what space remains for ethics?
Sapolsky: Ethics remains crucial, but it too must evolve. It shifts from judging actions in a binary moral framework to understanding behaviors in a holistic context that includes biological predispositions and environmental factors. This doesn't eliminate morality but complicates it, demanding that we consider not just the action but the entirety of influences that led to it.
Sandel: It seems, then, that our fundamental disagreement revolves around how we view the nature of human freedom and its implications for morality and justice. You see determinism as a framework that informs and guides our understanding of behavior, requiring societal structures to adapt accordingly. Meanwhile, I worry about the consequences of diminishing the role of individual moral agency in our pursuit of justice and the good life.
Sapolsky: Indeed, Michael. While I respect the intention behind your concerns, I believe that embracing the insights of determinism offers a path to a more compassionate and just society. It's a shift that recognizes the complexity of human behavior and seeks to address it in a manner that is both scientifically informed and ethically nuanced.
Sandel: And there lies our impasse. Though we share common goals, our visions for achieving them diverge at a fundamental level. This discussion has illuminated the profound complexities at the intersection of biology, morality, and justice, reminding us of the enduring challenges in understanding and shaping human behavior.
Sapolsky: Precisely. Our debate, while unresolved, highlights the importance of continued dialogue across disciplines to grapple with these questions. The pursuit of knowledge and understanding, especially in areas as complex as free will and moral responsibility, benefits from diverse perspectives, even—or perhaps especially—when they conflict.
In this continued dialogue, Sandel and Sapolsky reach the heart of their disagreement: the role and extent of individual agency within the constraints of determinism. While both scholars aim for a society that fosters moral behavior, their debate underscores the tension between acknowledging biological and environmental determinants of behavior and preserving the concept of individual moral choice. This conversation encapsulates the challenging balance between scientific insights into human behavior and the philosophical traditions of morality and free will.
Sandel: If we continue down your path, Robert, I fear we might arrive at a society where the concept of personal achievement or moral progress loses its meaning. If every action is the result of deterministic processes, then the notion of striving—to be better, to overcome adversity—could be seen as illusory. How do we then inspire individuals to aspire towards greater ethical standards or achievements?
Sapolsky: Michael, I understand your concerns, but I believe this perspective offers a different kind of inspiration. When we understand the deterministic influences on behavior, we can strive not in the traditional sense of overcoming these influences through sheer will, but by intelligently designing our environments and interventions to promote positive outcomes. This doesn't devalue achievement; it contextualizes it within a framework that acknowledges the complexity of human behavior.
Sandel: But isn't there a risk that this approach leads to a form of paternalism, where the state or scientific elite decides what is 'best' for individuals, based on their understanding of determinism? How do we reconcile this with the value of autonomy and the freedom to choose, even to fail?
Sapolsky: The challenge, then, is to navigate these insights responsibly, ensuring that they empower individuals rather than restrict them. This necessitates a democratic dialogue about how we apply our understanding of determinism, a dialogue that must include ethicists, scientists, policymakers, and, crucially, the public. Autonomy can still be valued within this framework, but it's informed by an understanding of the constraints we face.
Sandel: This brings us to another point of contention. By emphasizing determinism, do we not run the risk of fostering a society that is overly deterministic in its outlook, one that may be less forgiving, less capable of hope or redemption, because it views individuals as products of their biology and environment rather than as agents capable of change?
Sapolsky: On the contrary, Michael, recognizing the deterministic factors influencing behavior opens the door to more compassionate and effective approaches to rehabilitation and change. It allows us to see the potential for transformation not through moral condemnation but through understanding and addressing the underlying causes of behaviors. This perspective doesn't close the door on hope or redemption; it redefines them in more tangible, achievable terms.
Sandel: Yet, this redefinition seems to sideline the role of personal effort and moral deliberation in favor of a model that could be seen as mechanistic. Doesn't the dignity of human choice lie in the capacity to decide, to weigh ethical considerations, and to act upon them, regardless of our biological and environmental conditioning?
Sapolsky: Dignity, Michael, can also be found in the recognition of our shared humanity, in understanding the complex interplay of factors that shape our behavior. This doesn't negate the role of personal effort; it situates it within a broader, more realistic context. The challenge is to balance these insights with respect for the individual, fostering an environment where personal and social transformation is possible and celebrated.
Their continued disagreement reveals the depth of the philosophical divide between Sandel and Sapolsky. Sandel worries about the potential loss of individual agency and moral striving in a deterministic framework, while Sapolsky argues for a redefined notion of personal achievement and moral progress that incorporates deterministic insights. This dialogue underscores the tension between preserving the notion of free will and embracing a scientific understanding of human behavior, a debate that is central to contemporary discussions of ethics, justice, and human nature.
New thoughts (4/8/24):
My journaling, current reading and reflection have made me want to follow up on this piece. I want to share my updated thinking regarding one aspect of what I wrote:
"Now, people might get triggered by the implications of this perspective. 'So you're saying no one is responsible for their actions?' Kind of - yes. At least that's the conclusion Sapolsky shared in Determined, and I agree with (i.e., Do you blame someone for having a mental illness? Sapolsky argues that the same biological past that leads to someone having a mental illness is the same biological 'stuff' that dictates our decisions, which we perceive we have agency over but don't)."
I already said "kind of" in my statement, but I don't think I captured the nuance of how on the edge I feel about this in my piece. And I have been currently navigating these new question that have popped up as a result of this turmoil in my mind: Is what I wrote saying that I believe there is no distinction between what is right or wrong? How have we defined right or wrong in the past and now? And how does that affect how we move and act in the world? I don't think Sapolsky is saying that you can just have people hurting other people without consequence, but I still struggle with does that mean we can't hold anyone morally responsible?
I'm currently exploring Michael Sandel's justice lectures (https://scholar.harvard.edu/sandel/justice) and I hope to have more thoughts on this later.